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R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875 (1998).
Elizabeth Bartholet"
Richard Banks's article The Color of Desire' questions whether private
racial preferences for same-race children, and state agency practices
accommodating and encouraging such preferences, should be accepted as
legitimate. Why are so many people so ready to assume that it is natural, and
appropriate, to think in racial terms in the intimate family context? I agree with
Banks that it is important to question this assumption. I agree that there is a
connection between these private racial preferences and the public racial
preferences that are generally condemned as "discrimination." I agree that
private racial preferences are not inherent, unalterable conditions of
humankind, but rather products of our social conditioning. And I agree with
Banks that it would be good to take steps to change the way people think
about race in the family context. This is an important part of why I have long
advocated elimination of state-imposed barriers to transracial adoption,2 and
why I have argued that the state should not exercise any preference whatsoever
for placing children with racially matched families.3 Such policies not only
prevent the formation of transracial families, but also condition people to think
badly of racial intimacy.
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences Through
Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE LJ. 875 (1998).
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLmrICS OF PARENTING
86-117 (1993); Elizabeth Bartholet, Race Separatism in the Family: More on the Transracial Adoption
Debate, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 99 (1995); Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991) [hereinafter Banholet. Where
Do Black Children Belong?].
3. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?, supra note 2, at 1251-52.
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But if we are to think seriously about the problem of racial preferences in
the intimate family context, we need to look at the arenas in which these
preferences are operating most significantly4 and to address decisions about
romantic and sexual relationships, marriage, traditional procreation, and the
production of children through reproductive technology and surrogacy
arrangements.
Banks's article focuses on an oddly limited part of the relevant terrain:
private preferences in adoption only, and only as facilitated by the state.
Private preferences, however, are conditioned by public policy in the entire
family-decisionmaking arena, not simply in adoption. Public policy encourages
the creation of same-race families by a multitude of laws and practices. For
example, states "facilitate" private race preference when they license marriage
partners without inquiry into the role race played in partner selection. Our
society encourages racially matched parenting through employment and health
insurance policies that subsidize procreation, through constitutional doctrines
that protect the "right" to procreate, through free market policies that allow the
purchase and sale of sperm, eggs, embryos, and surrogacy services, and
through social conditioning that puts a high value on parenting genetically
related children. At the same time, our society discourages adoption through
restrictive regulation, making adoption expensive while failing to provide the
financial subsidies that we accord procreation, and stigmatizing adoption as a
second-class form of parenting. And in discouraging adoption, we discourage
transracial families, because the children in need of adoptive homes here and
abroad are, overwhelmingly, non-Caucasian, and the adults seeking to become
adoptive parents are, overwhelmingly, Caucasian.
By trying to force a fit between his racial theory and the transracial
adoption debate, Banks mischaracterizes both the nature of that debate and the
nature of the problem facing black children. He describes the debate as if it
involved a group of whites defending transracial adoption and facilitative
accommodation arrayed against a group of blacks defending race matching. He
portrays the white position as based on a classic liberal conception of the
autonomous individual, and as placing greater value on the white parent's
autonomy interests than on the black child's equality interests.5 He claims that
the white position promotes white group interests while the black position
promotes black group interests,6 although he says the white position is
purportedly race blind.
But black and white groups and interests do not stack up so neatly in this
debate. There is enormous support among whites, especially those in the child
welfare system, for race matching. At the same time, polls demonstrate very
4. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACIAL REGULATION OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION: SEX, MARRIAGE AND
ADOPTION (forthcoming 1998).
5. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 1, at 895, 914.
6. See id. at 922-28.
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little support among blacks in the general population for the National Black
Social Workers Association's position supporting race matching.' And leading
black intellectuals have joined with whites in challenging race-matching
policies.8 Moreover, commitment to adult autonomy and race-blind theory
does not characterize my position or that of many who have been outspoken
in opposing race matching. 9
Banks finds it an "anomaly" that those of us opposing state-imposed
barriers to transracial adoption have not addressed the issue of "facilitative
accommodation,"' t as though we were not aware that the phenomenon exists.
Of course it exists, and of course it could be legally challenged. The issue for
me, however, is whether it would be a good idea to try to eliminate private
preferences with the coercive measures that Banks suggests. I agree that the
state should take no action to encourage the exercise of private racial
preference. But Banks goes further, arguing that the state should not allow
prospective adopters to consider race.
Here I disagree with Banks. I do place some value on autonomy, and do
not think the state should get in the business of limiting choice in marriage,
procreation, or adoptive relationships," unless absolutely necessary. And
although I think that it would be good for more people to cross racial and
other lines of difference in the formation of their families, I do not think that
it is so clearly bad if many others form families on the basis of similarities in
racial, religious, ethnic, and national heritage. Banks argues that his proposals
will help alleviate the plight of many African-American children now held for
long periods in foster care.' 2 I fear that if his proposed system were ever
implemented it might hurt the life chances of the very children he wants to
help.
In reforming the role race plays in adoption, the logical place to start is
with the elimination of state-imposed barriers to transracial adoption. Banks
writes as if this problem had been solved with the passage of the Multiethnic
Placement Act and Interethnic Adoption Provisions collectively known as
7. See Bartholet, Where Do Black Chdldren Belong' , supra note 2. at 1236 n 206. id, at 1179-80
8. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identirty and Child Placement. Thre Best hterests of Black and
Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925 (1994); Ezra E.H. Gnffith. Culture and the Debate on Adoption
of Black Children by White Families, 14 AM. PSYCHIATRIC PRESS REV PSYCHIATRY 543 01995). Randall
Kennedy, My Race Problem-And Ours, ATLAirmC MoNTILY. May 1997. at 55 (quclioning the value of
"racial pride" and "racial kinship").
9. See, e.g., Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong'. supra note 2. at 1226-56. Joan Hieifctz
Hollinger, Responses to Where Do Black Children Belong. REcONSTRL'CTIO,. 1992 No 4. at 48. 49-51.
Laurence H. Tribe, Trans-Racial Adoption. RECONSTRcCtrON. 1992 No. 1. at 105
10. E.g., Banks, supra note 1, at 882 n.24, 887. 914,
11. Our legal system has traditionally placed a high value on autonomy in the procreation context, but
not in the adoption context. I do not, however, find the distinction made beteen these two ways of
forming a parental relationship appropriate. See BARTHOLE., supra note 2. at 76-78
12. See Banks, supra note 1, at 927.
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MEPA.' 3 He claims that the nature of the current debate "virtually guarantees
a move away from race matching."' 4 Would that it were so. Federal law has
prohibited the use of race to delay or deny adoptive placement since 1994,"5
and the 1996 amendments eliminated a provision that had allowed race to be
a "permissible consideration,"1 6 creating a new regime in which federally
funded agencies are not allowed to use race at all in making foster and
adoptive placement decisions. But there is enormous resistance to this law, and
it appears so far to have had little impact.17 State social service agencies tend
to be committed from top to bottom to their race-matching ways. Private
foundations and nonprofit child welfare groups have joined forces with public
agencies to promote "kinship care,"' 8 in part to help ensure that children in
need of homes remain within their racial group. "Cultural competence" is one
of the code phrases in the post-MEPA era for assessing whether agencies
remain sufficiently committed to same-race matching and whether they are
doing enough to recruit families of color to make same-race placement
possible. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, responsible for
enforcing MEPA, is peopled with child welfare traditionalists imbued with the
race-matching ideology, and has done little to date to ensure that federally
funded state adoption agencies live up to MEPA's mandate. MEPA may
someday have a significant impact but, for now, race matching by the state is
alive and well.
Because state-imposed racial barriers remain the order of the day, there is
no way of knowing how much of a problem private race preferences would
pose if those barriers were actually eliminated. Banks purports to describe a
world in which private preferences are operating to deny black children
adoption opportunities, but this is a hypothetical world. We do not know
whether private preferences would have a significant negative impact on black
children's adoption opportunities if state-imposed barriers that now exist were
eliminated. We do know, however, that a significant percentage of prospective
adopters on public agency waiting lists show an interest in adopting across
13. See id. at 900 & n.105 (discussing the Multiethnic Placement Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b (West
Supp. 1997)).
14. Id. at 927.
15. See Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 551-
554, 108 Stat. 4056, 4056-57 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b).
16. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-108, § 1808(c), I10 Stat. 1755,
1904 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b).
17. I have been actively involved for over a decade in research, writing, and advocacy related to race
and adoption issues including, more recently, work designed to assess MEPA's impact and to promote its
implementation. I base the claims in this paragraph on this ongoing work and on Telephone Interview with
Joan Hollinger, Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, and Member, Permanency
Guidelines Expert Work Group, Interagency Initiative of the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (Mar. 4, 1998); and Telephone Interview with Richard Barth,
Director, Center for Social Services Research, University of California at Berkeley (Mar. 5, 1998).
18. Kinship care involves the placement of children by state agencies with relatives for purposes of
foster care, adoption, or guardianship.
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racial lines.' 9 We also know that in the private agency world, where state
barriers do not exist, many transracial adoptions take place and black children
are generally placed promptly.2 We might, therefore, very well solve the
problems of the black children in foster care waiting for adoptive homes2 I by
simply implementing MEPA's mandate and eliminating state-imposed racial
barriers.
Banks's "strict nonaccommodation 2 would risk making things yet harder
on the children in foster and institutional care who need adoptive homes. What
would it mean for children awaiting adoption to be considered individually,
rather than being excluded categorically, by prospective parents who do not
want a child of another race? Most children awaiting adoption are old enough
to realize that they are being considered for adoption by the adults invited to
meet them individually or in groups.23 Most of them have already been
overwhelmingly battered by life. Many are bom damaged as a result of alcohol
and drug use by their mothers. Most suffer serious abuse or neglect before
entering foster care, and then years of institutional abuse and neglect as they
bounce from foster home to biological home and back again, or from one
foster home to another. Once these children are finally freed for adoption, do
we want to put them through more sessions of individual rejection than we
need to? Do we want to put pressure on prospective parents to adopt a black
child, even if they do not wish to do so?
Banks recognizes that his proposal might drive many prospective adopters
from the public adoption system into the private agency and independent
adoption worlds, where two-thirds of all adoptions already take place. 4 But
he argues that those who will exit will be white prospective adopters without
any interest in adopting transracially and that therefore no harm will follow to
the black children waiting to be adopted, or to the white children for whom he
claims there is an overabundance of waiting white parents. I think Banks
19. See JAMES BREAY, OFFICE OF FIELD SUPPORT SERVs.. MASSACHUSErrs DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS.,
WHO ARE THE WAITING CHILDREN? tbl.3.3 (1991) (reporting that approximately one-sixth of waiting white
families are interested in adopting minority race children).
20. See TOM GILLES & JOE KROLL, NORTH AM. COUNCIL O ADOPTABLE CHILDREN. BARRIERS TO
SAME RACE PLACEMENT 8, 9, 16, 20-21 (1991) (finding a significantly higher rate of trunsracial placement
in private, as compared to public, agencies). Th'is is part of wh) so many black birth parents choose to
place their children for adoption in the private rather than the public adoption system See Bartholet. Where
Do Black Children Belong?, supra note 2, at 1234.
21. See Banks, supra note 1, at 888 n.42 (noting that "all available data suggests that black children
are both less likely to be adopted than white children and likel) to spend a longer time waiting to be
adopted").
22. Id. at 940; see also id. at 940-63 (discussing the idea of strct nonaccommodation)
23. For a discussion of the characteristics of the children awaiting adoption discussed in this paragraph,
see generally JILL DUERR BERRICK ET AL., BAY AREA Soc. SERVS CONSORTIUM. FACTORS ASSOCIATED
WITH FAMILY REUNIFICATION OUTCOMES: UNDERSTANDING REENTRY TO CARE FOR INFANTS ( 1997). and
CAROL STATUTO BEVAN, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION. FOSTER CARE. Too Muct Too LrrrF Too
EARLY Too LATE (1996).
24. See Banks, supra note 1. at 956-58.
25. See id. at 957-58.
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is wrong on both counts. First, many prospective parents who might be
interested in children of another race, if given the chance to think about it, will
simply refuse to enter the public adoption system if it limits their choices even
more drastically than does today's system. Second, given the terrible damage,
both psychological and physical, suffered by many children in foster and
institutional care, we need an overabundance of prospective adopters in order
to have a chance of finding the needed homes.
If we want to help black children in foster care, we should start by
enforcing MEPA so as to take the state out of the business of promoting
racially matched families. There are many steps beyond enforcing MEPA that
would be both more effective and less intrusive than Banks's proposed course
of action. For example, we could expand the law to cover private agencies, as
suggested by the proposed Uniform Adoption Act,26 since most private
agencies engage in race matching, even if less insistently than public
agencies.2 7 In addition, instead of recruiting adoptive families for waiting
children on a same-race basis, as state agencies now do,2" we could cast the
recruitment net much more widely, encouraging black and white families alike
to consider adoption and to consider crossing the racial line. In the current
regime, social workers often question the emotional stability of prospective
parents who express an interest in transracial adoption. We should instead
socialize prospective parents to think positively about transracial parenting.
Our public adoption system already drives away many prospective
adopters, black and white, by virtue of its negative, restrictive, bureaucratized
nature. They flee to the private adoption world where, along with children and
birth mothers, they are treated much better. In that private world, many seek
to adopt on a same-race basis, but many others adopt across racial lines. Yet
others go abroad for international adoption where they typically adopt across
a variety of lines of difference-racial, ethnic, religious, and national. We
should be drawing prospective parents into our public adoption system, not
driving them away, if we want to advance the goals that Banks and I share:
improved life prospects for black children and a different understanding of the
role race should play in our private lives.
26. See UNIF. ADOPTION Act § 2-104(c) & cmt., 9 U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 1996).
27. See GILLES & KROLL, supra note 20, passim.
28. See Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong?, supra note 2, at 1196-97; Elizabeth Bartholet,
More Than Ever State Should Cast Wide Net in Search of Foster Parents, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14. 1997,
at A 1l.
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A Response to Elizabeth Bartholet
R. Richard Bankst
Professor Bartholet's correspondence is provocative and thoughtful. We
share a concern about the diminished pool of adoptive parents available to
black children, and we are both adamantly opposed to race matching by
adoption agency personnel. Bartholet, however, would permit race matching
by adoptive parents, whereas I would not.' I chose to write about what
Bartholet describes as an "oddly limited part of the relevant terrain 2 because
the particular characteristics of the adoption process offer a unique opportunity
to illustrate the ways in which private racial preferences, state policy, and
perceptual biases combine to produce widespread inequality that persists in part
because of our inability to "see" it.
Bartholet is equivocal about two facts that should not be in dispute. First,
she mischaracterizes both her work and the broader debate by stating that "[o]f
course [facilitative accommodation] exists, and of course it could be legally
challenged."3 Of course? Facilitative accommodation, which affects in excess
of 100,000 parents and children every year,' has not previously been identified
as a significant aspect of adoption policy, much less as race-based state action.
My article investigated this omission. More importantly, private racial
preferences produce widespread inequality in adoption, a circumstance
Bartholet describes as "hypothetical., 5 In fact, however, preference-produced
inequality is so ingrained in accepted adoption practices and outcomes that we
scarcely notice it.
In addition, Bartholet overstates the proportion of white parents willing to
adopt a black child. The study she cites 6 presents a classic sample selection
t Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
1. I am fully aware that race matching continues, in spite of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1996b (West Supp. 1997). Nonetheless, the passage of MEPA does represent a move away
from race matching. Bartholet does not consider the possibility that strict nonaccommodation. by prohibiting
all racial recordkeeping in adoption, might make it more possible to implement MEPA effectively. Strict
nonaccommodation is wholly compatible with ending race matching.
2. Elizabeth Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 YALE L. 2351. 2352
(1998) (correspondence).
3. Bartholet, supra note 2, at 2353.
4. See R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial Preferences
Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE LJ. 875, 878 & n.6 (1998).
5. Bartholet, supra note 2. at 2354.
6. See id. at 5 n.19 (citing JAMES BREAY, OFFICE OF FIELD SuPPORT SEsvs.. MAssACusErrs DEPT
OF SOCIAL SERVS., WHO ARE THE WAMNG CHILDREN? tbl.3.3 (1991)).
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problem.7 Moreover, the study's focus on parents' stated willingness to adopt
a "racial minority" child' elides the fact that white parents are significantly
more inclined to adopt a nonblack racial minority child than a black child."
Finally, the study itself found that parents were two to three times more likely
to consider adopting a sibling group or a disabled child than a single racial
minority child.'0
To think seriously about racial inequality in adoption, however, requires
that we move beyond a narrow focus on adoption rates. Bartholet has
previously identified as an adverse outcome of race matching the placement of
black children, but not white children, with "economically marginal" or "less
qualified" parents." Adoptive parents' racial preferences produce the same
sort of inequality. Even the study that Bartholet cites indicates that, because
of adoptive parents' preferences, any particular white child has access to a pool
of adoptive parents at least two to three times as large as that available to any
particular black child.' 2 Does Professor Bartholet seriously contend that this
state of affairs does not evidence racial inequality?
Bartholet and I both acknowledge that the adverse, unintended
consequences of strict nonaccommodation may outweigh its benefits, 3 in
which case we should certainly not implement the policy. We should be
mindful, however, of the risks of "protecting" children by deferring to the very
attitudes and practices that harm them. A decision to forgo strict
nonaccommodation should be viewed not as an example of sensibly practical
policy analysis, but as a tragic capitulation to private racial preferences
emblematic of the race-based thinking that threatens to corrupt American
democracy.
My article proposed a solution to racial inequality in adoption in part to
direct attention to the analytically prior step of refraning a broader social
problem. That preferences are difficult to challenge directly does not mean that
they are not a problem. To the contrary, they are a problem of such magnitude
that they limit the scope of the remedies we might consider.
7. The study involved only parents seeking to adopt children under the care of the Department of
Social Services in politically liberal Massachusetts. Because a much higher proportion of nonwhite children
are served through the Department than through private agencies, see Banks, supra note 4, at 898, the white
parents adopting through that route are likely to be much more racially open-minded than their non-child-
welfare-agency counterparts. Otherwise, they would not be adopting through the public agency process.
8. BREAY, supra note 6, at tbl.3.3.
9. See D. Brooks & R.P. Barth, Preferred Characteristics of Children in Need of Adoption Services:
A Comparison of Public/Private Agency and Independent Adopters and Workers' Responses to Expressed
Preferences for African American Children 3 tbl.l (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale
Law Journal).
10. See BREAY, supra note 6, at tbl.3.3.
II. Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163, 1199-200 (1991).
12. See BREAY, supra note 6, at tbl.3.3.
13. See Banks, supra note 4, at 955-58 (discussing the potential drawbacks of strict
nonaccommodation).
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